Abstract. This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity. With a linear tax schedule the marginal tax rate is shown to decrease with the number of children, while the relationship between the demogrant and family size appears to be ambiguous. With two ability levels, optimal non-linear income tax implies zero marginal tax rates for the higher ability parents; low ability parents have positive marginal tax rates that decrease with family size.
Introduction
In most countries, families with children benefit from income tax breaks and family allowances. Putting aside the objective of fostering or discouraging fertility, there are two main rationales behind these measures. One is to achieve some horizontal equity, namely, to compensate families for children-related expenses.1 Another rationale pertains to vertical equity and more specifically poverty alleviation. Child benefits tend to have a strong e¤ect on poverty particularly in countries where families with children have few resources. They allow for low income families with children to be kept above poverty line in many countries.2 These two objectives, vertical and horizontal equity, can conflict. Compensating high income households for having children requires a higher subsidy than compensating low income households for the same reason. Most tax breaks have that feature as they aim at restoring some horizontal fairness at the expense of vertical redistribution.
In general, child benefits are independent of income; they can be di¤er-entiated according to family size and age of children. In Table 1 , the pattern of variation is summarized for countries in the European Union. In any case, comparison of benefits has to take account of the relation with the tax systems. In fact both child benefits and tax allowances are part of the income tax system which depends not only on the level of income but also on family size. This is the view we adopt in this paper. We try to design an optimal tax system that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function and takes into account variable family size. The setting is one of imperfect information and thus of second best maximization. The government observes each household's size and income but cannot sort out the two sources of income, earnings ability and labor supply. In such a framework, we want to see whether or not the tax schedule is a¤ected by the number of children and if so, how. Is it through tax allowances or through child benefits? To do so, we first consider the case of a linear income tax schedule with the tax rate and the lump-sum transfer varying with the family size. We then turn to a non linear income tax.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the number of children varies across families but that it is exogenous. Endogenous fertility, more precisely fertility depending on economic variables, could have two implications: it would call for public policy aimed at a¤ecting population growth and it would lead to complex interactions between social and tax policy on the one hand and fertility decisions on the other. 3 Another assumption that is basic to our analysis is that children welfare depends on their parents decisions. Children are not financially autonomous 
means that per child benefit increases with the variable, ''À'' means that it decreases and ''¼'' that it is independent.
and if some of them are not well treated by their parents because of lack of resources or lack of altruism, the only way they can be helped by public authorities is through their parents' decisions. The objective of the social planner is utilitarian, namely, the sum of utilities of parents and children. As long as parents weight their children's welfare the same way as the social planner, the problem is rather standard. It becomes di¤erent if weights di¤er. For example, if parents weight their children's utility less than their own and if the social planner insist on equal weights, then we have a typical agency problem. With instruments limited to income taxation, we have no e¤ective way to secure that children are well-treated. This agency problem could induce the government to resort to policies directly aimed at children. By assuming a single consumption good, we cannot rely on indirect taxation that could foster child-specific goods rather than parents-specific goods; see Cigno and Pettini (2001) .
Anticipating the main results, we show that with a linear tax schedule, the marginal tax rate decreases with the number of children while the relationship between the demogrant and family size appears to be ambiguous. In other words, a tax break for the presence of children is theoretically better grounded than family allowances. We also show that with two ability levels optimal non-linear income tax implies zero marginal tax rates for the higher ability parents; low ability parents have positive marginal tax rates which decrease with family size. 4 In deriving these results, our main concern was to stay within the tradition of optimal income taxation theory5 and to keep the presentation rather simple. To do so, we make a number of simplifying assumptions (quasi linear preferences, independent distributions of productivities and family size, etc.). These restrictions admittedly limit the generality and surely the applicability of our conclusions.
The model
Consider a society consisting of parents and dependent children. A parent is characterized by a productivity level, w i , and by a number of children n j . The parent's utility depends on his own consumption, x, that of his children, c, and on his labor supply, L. It is given by:
where ij means that the parent has an ability w i ði ¼ 1; . . . ; mÞ and a number n j ð j ¼ 1; . . . ; sÞ of children. The function u is strictly concave; r ij is disposable (after tax) income; h is the monetary disutility of work, a strictly convex and increasing function; and g denotes the factor of altruism. The parent's consumption net of the cost of e¤ort is:6
For the time being, we assume g ¼ 1. For given r and L, c ij is chosen so that:
which yields
We can now define the ''indirect'' utility function:
where y ij ¼ w i L ij is before tax income. The information structure is as follows. The tax administration observes the number of children, n j , and before tax income y ij . After tax income r ij is then of course also observable, but its allocation between parent's consumption, x, and children's consumption, c, is private information. Finally, labor supply, L ij , and ability, w i , are not observable. The information structure thus resembles that used in traditional optimal taxation models, except that we have an observable source of heterogeneity, namely family size, in addition to the traditional adverse selection variable (unobservable ability). The tax function can then be conditioned on this observable variable and we have
where T j ðy ij Þ is the tax schedule applied to families of size n j . We now turn to the determination of the optimal tax schedules T j ð y ij Þ, j ¼ 1; . . . ; s. First, we shall assume that T j is restricted to be linear. Then, we shall consider a setting in which T j is restricted solely by the information available to the tax administration; this is the general income tax problem.
The optimal linear income tax
We use a linear income tax schedule specified by
with marginal tax rate, t j , and demogrant, a j , varying with the number of children. Then, the indirect utility function (3) can be redefined as:
where L ij ¼ L ij ðð1 À t j Þw i Þ is the labor supply function with net (after tax) wage as sole argument; with the utility function specified by (1), labor supply does not depend on a j . The government maximizes a utilitarian welfare function given by
where p ij is the proportion of families of type ij in the total population (of parents), the size of which is normalized at one.7 Assuming a purely redistributive tax, the revenue constraint is given by:
and the Lagrangean expression can be written as follows:
where m is the multiplier associated with the revenue constraint. Di¤erentiating L 1 with respect to t j and a j , j ¼ 1; . . . ; s, yields after some manipulations these two well-known formulas:
where h ij is the marginal utility of income andẽ e ij the compensated elasticity of labor (here equal to the uncompensated elasticity).
To interpret these expressions observe that we are solving an optimal linear income tax problem within each of the s di¤erent ''classes'' (a class being characterized by a given family size). These s problems are independent of each other except for the fact that there is a global budget constraint.9 Consequently, it is not surprising that the marginal tax rate in each class is determined according to the traditional trade-o¤ between redistributive benefits and e‰ciency cost of taxation. This is shown by the RHS of (8), with the covariance term measuring redistributive benefits, while the deadweight loss is determined by the compensated elasticity of labor supply.
Turning to (7), this condition says that the average marginal utility of income has to be the same in each of the s classes. In other words, the average marginal utility of income is equalized between di¤erent family sizes. This is not surprising. In a first best setting (complete information or whenẽ e ij ¼ 0) the utilitarian government would equalize marginal utilities of income within and between classes. In our second-best setting, where productivities are not observable marginal utilities of income within each class are not equalized. However, since family size is observable, it is clearly desirable to adjust the a j 's so that average marginal utilities of income are the same for any family size.
To get a more precise understanding of the role that family size plays for the optimal tax policy one has to examine how t j and a j are a¤ected by the number of children n j . This relationship will of course depend on the distribution of types and specifically on the distribution of wage conditional on family size. For instance, a positive correlation between wage and family size (the proportion of high wages is larger for large families) will be a factor contributing to a higher tax (a lower level of a j ) on large families.10 More generally, when the distributions of w and n are not independent, the observable family size can be used as a signal for the unobservable ability and this will clearly a¤ect the structure of the tax policy.
For the remainder of the section we shall concentrate on a special case in which the distribution of wages is independent of family size. In other words, we are abstracting from the signal aspect just mentioned to examine if there is any other reason which would justify some systematic relationship between family size and the parameters of the tax function. Let us thus assume that p 
In words, e W W is the maximum level of welfare that can be achieved with marginal tax rates ðt 1 ; . . . ; t s Þ if the demogrants ða 1 ; . . . ; a s Þ are set optimally (i.e., to maximize welfare subject of the budget constraint). We now in a position to prove the following proposition.
the distribution of earnings abilities is independent of family size. Consider two di¤erent family sizes n k > n l .
(i) Starting from any vector of tax rates with t k ¼ t l , a welfare improvement can be achieved through a variation in tax rates dt k < 0 and dt l > 0, with dt k
optimal marginal tax rates decrease with family size. Proof. To prove (i) we derive the welfare change associated with the variation in tax rates and which using (9) is given by:
Using (5) and (9) we have:
Rearranging (11) and (12) yields:
Substituting (14) and (15) into (10), using dt k
To prove that (17) holds, first observe that with t l ¼ t k , and hence
In words, as wage increases, per-capita consumption increases at a faster rate in smaller families, l, than in larger families, k. Condition (13) then implies
Consequently, u 0 ðx 1k Þ À u 0 ðx 1l Þ > 0, while u 0 ðx mk Þ À u 0 ðx ml Þ < 0; these two inequalities along with the property that w i L i increases with wage can then easily be shown to imply (17).11 This completes the proof of (i). Part (ii) then follows immediately from the concavity assumption. 9
Finally and in the same vein, we would have liked to show that a j is positively related to n j . Even though such a result is quite intuitive and is obtained in the numerical examples we conducted, it cannot be proved to always hold.
To discuss the intuition behind these results let us note two properties which can be shown from (7) and (8) . First, if t j were constrained to be constant for all j, a j would increase with n j . Second and conversely, if a j were restricted to be constant, t j would decrease with n j . Note, however, that in the first case, a j can do a lot towards horizontal redistribution but little towards vertical redistribution. In the second case, t j can achieve both types of redistribution. It is thus not surprising that when combining both instruments, t j ''dominates'' a j and it can even happen that a j decreases with n j . To put it another way, consider a tax schedule with uniform t and variable a j : For the average wage, one can achieve the same outcome with alternative tax schedule characterized by uniform a and a variable t j . Moreover, with the alternative schedule, the vertical redistribution within each n j group is better from a utilitarian viewpoint.
Non-linear income tax
We now turn to the non-linear income tax problem. To study this case, we assume m ¼ 2: there are just two levels of productivity w 2 > w 1 . The government's objective continues to be a simple utilitarian welfare function. Recall that family size is observable while productivity is not observable. To solve the problem we first determine the allocation which maximizes welfare subject to the resource constraint and the self-selection constraints. A complete solution of the optimal tax problem per-se then requires the design of the implementing income tax functions T j ð y ij Þ, j ¼ 1; . . . ; s.
The individuals' preferences over ðr; yÞ, that is in the space of observable variables, are given by (3); they are crucial ingredient in the non linear income tax problem. Specifically, it is useful to define:
which represents the individual's marginal rate of substitution (slope of an indi¤erence curve), obtained by di¤erentiating (3). Observe that with the considered structure of preferences a depends only on y and not on r.12 Further, a depends on the wage, but not on family size. Finally, it is easy to show that a decreases with w:
In other words, for any given level of y, high-wage individuals have flatter indi¤erence curves than low-wage individuals. This corresponds to the traditional ''single-crossing property''. For each n j , the incentive compatibility constraint of high-wage workers is given by:
Using (3) this condition can be expressed as:
With a utilitarian objective function and given (20), it is easy to show that (21) will be binding within each family size class j, while the incentive constraint of the low wage type is never relevant. Observe that mimicking between family size classes is not possible because n is observable.
We are now in a position to state the government's problem. Let l j denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraints and m, that associated with the budget constraint. The Lagrangean of the social planner problem can be written as:
Observe that, like in the linear case, we are again faced with s problems (one for each family size class) which are related only through the budget constraint. 13 The first-order conditions are:
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that the maximization of utility (3) subject to the (after tax) budget constraint (4) yields:
where T 0 j ðy ij Þ is the marginal income tax rate. Consequently, we can use the marginal rates of substitution determined by the first-order conditions to characterize the marginal tax rates implied by the implementing tax function.14 We obtain the following results:
High-wage individuals
Combining (24) and (25) we obtain,
which from (26) implies
In each type of family, there is no distortion at the top; the marginal tax rate is zero for the higher ability parents. Furthermore, given our specification,
Higher productivity individuals have the same labor supply irrespective of family size.
Low-wage individuals: sign of marginal tax rate
Dividing (22) by (23), while rearranging and making use of (19) and (20) (for the inequality) yields:
where a 2 ð y 1j Þ is simply the marginal rate of substitution of the mimicking individual. The inequality in (28) comes from m, l j > 0 and a 2 ðy 1j Þ < 1 which, follows from y ij < y 2j and a 2 ð y 2j Þ ¼ 1. In words, whatever their family size all low wage individuals have a marginal rate of substitution which is smaller than one. From (28) and (26) we then obtain:
Consequently, we have established that all low wage individuals face a positive marginal tax rate. Summing up, we have shown that the traditional properties obtained in the two-types optimal income tax model continue to hold here within every family size class. Observe that no assumption on the distribution of wages (beyond s ¼ 2) were necessary to establish this property. In particular, the fact that the two wage levels are the same for each family size is not necessary. Consequently, the ''top'' individual in, say, class j would have a zero marginal tax rate even if his wage were in fact lower than that, say, both types in class k. This is a direct implication of the information structure and specifically the assumption that the number of children is observable.
Like in the linear case, we would now like to go beyond this general characterization and examine if there is some systematic relationship between family size and (marginal) taxes. Once again, we shall look at this question for the case where the (conditional) distribution of wages is the same for all family sizes. With the marginal tax rate of the high wage type independent of family size, we are left with the comparison of the marginal tax rate faced by the low wage individual.
Low-wage individuals: marginal tax rate and family size
The main result is formally stated in the following proposition. Roughly speaking it says that when the distribution of wages is independent of family size, then the marginal tax rate of the low wage individual decreases with family size.
the distribution of earnings abilities is independent of family size. Further assume that h 000 > 0. Consider two di¤erent family sizes n k > n l .
(i) The optimal utilitarian allocation, constrained by the information structure satisfies:
(ii) The implementing tax function satisfies:
Proof. The proof proceeds by combining a certain number of properties in order to show that all cases not satisfying (30) and (31) can be ruled out. The relevant properties are stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that n k > n l . Then
Proof. Lemma 1 is a direct implication of the incentive constraint. When (21) is binding, we can write:
Therefore:
Di¤erentiating the RHS of (35) with respect to y 1j gives:
Evaluating (35) for l and k and making use of (36) then implies (33). 9
From now on we assume p j ij 1 p ij = P i p ij ¼ p i and h 000 > 0. Turning to the next property, we have:
Proof. This relationship follows directly from the condition
which in turn is obtained by combining first-order conditions (22) and (23). 9
Next, it is easy to check that x 1k ¼ x 1l and y 1k ¼ y 1l for k 0 l are not possible. Consequently, we are then left with two possibilities: (i)
(ii)
Finally, we can eliminate case (ii) by showing:
Lemma 3. Assume that n k > n l . Then then x 1k < x 1l and y 1k < y 1l cannot simultaneously hold.
Proof. To establish Lemma 3, first note that from Lemma 1, y 1l > y 1k implies
Furthermore, by adding (23) and (25) we obtain
from which we obtain that
But (35) implies x 2k À x 1k > x 2l À x 1l which contradicts (41). 9 We can now finalize the proof of Proposition 2. As a consequence of the above lemmas, we must have case (i). Consequently, we have established (30), which from (26) also implies (32). Finally, (31) directly results from (27) along with the incentive constraint. 9
Proposition 2 has a number of interesting implications. First, is shows that low wage families with a larger family size face a smaller marginal tax rate and have higher pre-tax income. Consequently their labor supply is also higher. Second, we obtain a pattern of consumption levels x ij as represented on Fig. 1 . Specifically, inequality in per capita consumption (between high and low wage families) decreases with family size. Third, the property that x 2k < x 2l , along with the result that y 2k ¼ y 2l , shows that the tax policy does not fully compensate type k families for their larger size.
In this section, like in the previous one, we have assumed that there is no correlation between family size and productivity. One could of course obtain very di¤erent results if such a correlation were introduced. Assume for example, that there is a strong positive correlation between n and w. Then, one can no longer exclude the possibility that the tax rate increases with family size. The e¤ect obtained in the no correlation case continues to be at work. However, family size now also acts as a signal for productivity and this e¤ect calls for a higher tax on large families.
Numerical example
Let us now turn to a numerical illustration with two objectives. First, we want to contrast the results obtained in the linear and the non-linear cases. The general expressions cannot give us a good grasp of how these results di¤er. Second, we want to consider the possibility of non-balanced altruism.
We adopt a setting with three productivity levels (w 1 ¼ 10, w 2 ¼ 20 and w 3 ¼ 50) and three family sizes (n 1 ¼ 0, n 2 ¼ 1 and n 3 ¼ 3). The population is equally shared between all these groups (p ij ¼ 1=9; Eij). The objective of the government is utilitarian, that is, the social welfare function is the sum of utilities of parents and children. The social planner observes the number of children (n j ) and the parent's income ( y ij ) but neither the productivity (w i ), nor the labor supply (L ij ). The parent's utility function is:
1 À e ; if e 0 1; We examine how the tax schedule is a¤ected by the number of children. First, we look at the linear income tax problem. The tax liability is given by:
where t j is the linear tax rate and a j the demogrant. Observe that this demogrant cannot directly be interpreted as a ''family allowance''. To obtain a measure of the child benefits implied by the tax system, one has to take into account the fact that even childless families may have a demogrant. The allowance per child can then be defined as:
where a 1 is the demogrant received by households having no children. Results are reported in Table 2 . The demogrant and the child benefit are increasing with the family size while the tax rate is a decreasing function. Broadly speaking, there is a transfer going from households with high income but no children to poor families with children. So both instruments, namely income taxation and child benefits, contribute to redistribute income horizontally as well as vertically. Another basic finding is that the child cost (c ij ) increases with the family income. Therefore, the child benefits more than compensate for the child cost in poor families, but not in rich ones. This is an consequence of our utilitarian objective function along with the rigidity of our tax instruments. The government is utilitarian and families as well. In rich families, children are well-treated and one cannot expect family allowances to fully finance their consumption.
Similar conclusions are drawn in the non-linear case (Table 3) : (i) the marginal tax rate (T 0 ij ) is a decreasing function of the family size; (ii) the tax liability (T ij ) increases with the productivity level and decreases with the family size; (iii) the higher the household earnings are, the higher the child cost is. We also find the Mirrlees (1971) result according to which there is no distortion at the top (T 0 ij ¼ 0 for high ability households). Compared to the linear case, one observes that now the tax burden is more redistributive. The tax liability for a poor and large family relative to that for a rich and large family is -23-5 We use this numerical example to explore the case of selfish parents and thus the question of di¤erential altruism. It is possible that parent's altruism is lower than what the social planner would like. For instance, parents could weight their children's welfare less than their own while the government insists on equal weights (g < 1). We examine how the tax schedule is a¤ected by this divergence.
There are two e¤ects acting in opposite directions. On the one hand, the government would like to give more to large families to compensate children for the parent's lack of altruism. But, on the other hand, the major beneficiaries are selfish parents, not children. With a logarithmic utility function, both e¤ects cancel. With an isoelastic function and a low e (we have here assumed e ¼ 1=2), the second e¤ect overwhelms the first one (see Table 4 ).15 More precisely, the demogrant is larger for households without children but smaller for large families, while the tax rate is respectively lower and higher than when parents are as altruistic as the social planner. Family allowances remain increasing and the tax rate decreasing with the family size, but at a slower pace than when there is no di¤erence in altruism. We should keep in mind that the less altruistic parents are, the more they consume relative to their children. Finally, with a high elasticity (e ¼ 3=2), the profile of tax rates and family allowances for increasing n is relatively independent of the value of g.
One of the interesting implications of this example is that it underlines the inadequacy of linear income taxation to cope with such a merit-good problem. More e¤ective policies could be introduced in (at least) two ways. The first possibility considers explicitly a consumption vector consisting of several goods. This opens the door to possible subsidies for child-specific commodities like in Cigno and Pettini (2001) . Alternatively, one could resort to policies targeted towards children. In future research we plan to study this agency issue wherein the government could try to elicit parents' altruism and to provide when needed specific services to the children. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the optimal income taxation with di¤erent family sizes and ability levels. We have taken into account the informational problem to which the social planner is confronted; it cannot observe the sources of income, namely the innate ability or the labor supply. Under this setting, we have shown that the income linear tax rate should decrease with the family size. With a non-linear tax schedule, we have found the well-known result that there should be no distortion at the top. At lower ability levels, the marginal tax rate should decrease with the number of children and increase with the productivity.
The numerical example shows that fiscal parameters are pretty independent of the parent's altruism. In this model, the government can help children only through their parent's decision. So the major beneficiaries of tax cuts for large families and child benefits are selfish parents, not children.
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1 See Balcer and Sadka (1986) , Balestrino (1994) , Cremer et al. (1999) and Kaplow (1992) . 2 See Delhausse et al. (1998) . 3 See Carrin (1982) , Cigno (1983) , Cigno (1986) and Cigno and Pettini (1999) for the case where fertility is endogenous. Balestrino (1998) and Cigno (1996) have studied endogenous as well as exogenous fertility cases. as the individuals marginal tax rates. 15 Only results from the linear income tax problem are reported. But same conclusions can be drawn from the non-linear income tax problem.
